Argentine Army Day: this is how our Armed Forces were born

A celebration that should not go unnoticed is the commemoration of the "Argentine Army Day", which is observed every May 29. Many will remember its motto: "It was born with the Nation, in 1810." However, the creator of the Army was not precisely the First Junta. In fact, its creator was not even Argentine. It is also not entirely true that our army originated in 1810. Its actual birth dates back a few years earlier.

Already in colonial times, and to defend against Portuguese or British ambitions, the "Regimiento Fijo de Infantería de Buenos Aires" had been established, with its main base in that Province; but its troops were also distributed throughout much of the Viceroyalty. Most of its soldiers were Creoles and their performance left much to be desired when they had to intervene: against the Portuguese (who managed to occupy Colonia) and during the First British Invasion (when they scattered in the first skirmish). They lacked the necessary equipment, training, and discipline. Their officers (mostly Spanish) were lax, and were not trained in military tactics or strategy. Basically, they garrisoned the fortresses of the Viceroyalty (Buenos Aires, Ensenada, San Miguel, Santa Tecla, and Santa Teresa).

In the cavalry, the "Blandengues" stood out, who were Creole militias that guarded the borders against the indigenous people and the Portuguese. There were mainly Blandengues in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Montevideo. Gervasio Artigas, Estanislao López, and José Rondeau began their careers as "Blandengues." At first, they were armed with lances; but later, Viceroy Vértiz provided them with sabers, pistols, and carbines. Their name was due to the way the soldiers "brandished" their lances when saluting authorities during inspections.

The Royal Artillery Corps was almost nonexistent. Of the 200 troops, only 40 guarded the Buenos Aires fort. The rest were in the Banda Oriental.

After the failure of the "Fijo" Regiment in 1806, when its inaction allowed only 1,600 British troops to take a city of more than 40,000 souls, almost without a fight; the General Commander of Arms, Santiago de Liniers y Bremond, decided to reinforce the colonial corps to resist a new British attempt. Thus, this Frenchman, on September 6, 1806, draftedon the people of Buenos Aires to enlist in various corps, according to each recruit's origin. This was the seed of the future Argentine Army.

"One of man's most sacred duties is the defense of the Nation that feeds him," Liniers said in his draft - "and the inhabitants of Buenos Aires have always shown that they know and fulfill this precious obligation with precision." His call was very well received. The people came to enlist, unlike what had happened until then, when people avoided enlisting or contributing to the colonial militias, which were viewed with antipathy and disdain.

Thus, the sons of Buenos Aires had to join the "Patricios" Corps; those born in the Northern Provinces, the "Arribeños" (this is where, for example, a Tucumán native living in the Capital at that time would have enlisted); freed Black and mestizo men and indigenous people residing in Buenos Aires, the "Castas" Corps, or "Pardos y Morenos." Spaniards also had to form their own battalions, called "Tercios." Thus, the Tercios of: "Gallegos," "Andaluces," "Montañeses," "Cántabros" (formed by Vizcainos and Asturians) were established.

The cavalry was not very numerous. Not everyone had a horse. The officers used their own. Pueyrredón, when forming his famous "Húsares del Rey," helped to clothe and mount them, as he came from a family that had made its fortune in commerce. The "Migueletes," "Cazadores," "Carabineros," and "Quinteros" (riders from the outskirts) stood out.

The artillery remained scarce and rudimentary, under the command of the "Patriotas de la Unión" (which included Spaniards and Creoles, hence its name) and the "Pardos y Morenos." It was the least prestigious of the branches and the least valued. It was not attractive to have to drag heavy cannons, load them, and be covered in gunpowder, smoke, and shrapnel, or to be shot at without being able to defend oneself, because one had to serve the cannon. The advances that the French had introduced in artillery, which had contributed to their victories, were unknown. Napoleon himself was a General of Artillery. Napoleonic artillerymen, proud, rejected any weapon for self-defense, saying that their best defense was "the smoke of their cannons." It would still be some time before Argentine artillery would acquire the importance that made it stand out at Ituzaingó and other actions, under the command of General Tomás de Iriarte.

This new army had more than 7,800 troops, and training began immediately. The corps had to attend the Fort on fixed days "in order to organize the battalions and companies, appointing the commanders and their seconds, the captains and their lieutenants, at the will of the corps themselves." It was a novelty for the troops to elect their own chiefs and officers; nor was any training required. This departed from what was stipulated in the Spanish Military Ordinances, but given the imminence of a new British attack and Liniers's prestige, no one opposed it.

The largest corps was the "Legión de Patricios Voluntarios Urbanos," as it was officially called, which formed three battalions. Next came the Castas (Pardos y Morenos) and the Arribeños. The army's colorful uniforms (some of which are still used in military parades), weapons, gunpowder, and new defense works were funded by donations, subscriptions, and loans collected throughout the provinces. 

The new army carried out drills and maneuvers, which the public attended and applauded. Martín Rodríguez, of the Húsares, would say, not without some exaggeration: "It can be said that three months after the creation of these Corps, they could compete with the best troops in Europe in their discipline and maneuvers." Manuel Belgrano, of the Patricios Corps, disagreed: "neither the discipline nor the subordination was what it should have been"; adding that the troops "joked wittily that, to defend the Nation's soil, they had not needed to learn to strike poses or make figures in public squares for the amusement of idle women."

The baptism of fire for the new, mostly Creole army took place during the Second British Invasion, with much courage and bravery (and not so much military technique) that even the British officers themselves acknowledged it: "These people are not the effeminate race found in Spain: on the contrary, they are fierce and only need discipline to make them formidable." The British Minister of War himself declared before Parliament: "The merit of our soldiers was greatly increased by the valiant defense put up by the opponents. Just as this powerful resistance enhances the glory of the conquest, I hope that the courage shown by the Spanish troops will inspire their compatriots in Europe to show a similar spirit in resisting the common enemy." This speech was delivered after the change that had occurred following Napoleon's invasion of Spain; when England then became an ally, against the French.

Between January and July 1807, fighting took place on both banks of the Río de la Plata against this new British attempt to take the Viceroyalty. During the days of the "Defensa" of Buenos Aires, this new and improvised army, together with the people of the city, led by Liniers, defeated more than 9,000 veteran professional English soldiers, forever dispelling their threat of conquest.

Then Captain of the Navy Santiago de Liniers was promoted, first to Field Marshal; and then, to Viceroy of the Río de la Plata (December 3, 1807). The Creoles became aware of their strength and their ability to defend themselves; that the Spanish Crown was not as invincible as it seemed; that in times of difficulty and external aggression, little or nothing could be expected from the Metropolis. The antipathy toward the militias was lost; and these began to approach those who were driving the idea of independence and autonomy.

As the self-confidence of the Creoles increased, so did the distrust toward the Spanish colonial forces. The Buenos Aires Cabildo itself came to state, regarding these: "What could be expected of Chiefs who, in all their lives, have thought least about organizing their regiments and subjecting them to discipline? The truth is that we have never seen a parade, and so all matters of service have gone. What could be expected of the subordinate officers, who, with the exception of one or two very rare ones, have made their careers in pastime, gambling, dancing, strolling, without ever devoting even a moment to anything concerning service? What could we, finally, expect from men who are so alert to their regiments, that the Fijo de Infantería now has only 72 soldiers on duty, and for these there are 94 officers; that the Dragones have about as many soldiers as the former, more or less, and even more officers, the same happening with the Blandengues?"

Many residents acknowledged that "the European battalions had long rivaled the Patricios." Cornelio Saavedra himself admitted that, for the Spaniards, "accustomed to seeing the sons of the country as their subordinates, and treating them with the air of conquerors, it was unpleasant to see them with weapons in hand."

The conflict came to a head during Liniers's Viceroyalty. The fact that he was not Spanish, and that he himself had created the Creole corps, whom he treated with great consideration, made him a very popular viceroy among them; even though his performance as a ruler left much to be desired. On the other hand, he gradually earned the distrust and suspicion of the Spaniards.

This crisis was exacerbated by Napoleon's invasion of Spain: with this, France became the enemy of the Spaniards. This was the last straw for them, and they began to look for a way to depose Liniers. The conspirators gathered around Martín de Alzaga, First Vote Mayor of Buenos Aires. The Cabildo itself was the center of the plot.

Also involved in the conspiracy were Bishop Lué, our well-known Mariano Moreno (who never liked Liniers), and the Spanish "Tercios" of Gallegos, Vizcaínos (Cántabros), and Catalans. On January 1, 1809, they took over the Plaza de la Victoria with these troops and supporters, shouting: "Death to the Frenchman Liniers!", "Junta as in Spain!", cheering the Cabildo.

Alzaga and Moreno arrived at the Fort to demand the viceroy's resignation. He, finding himself cornered, gave in and signed it. At that providential moment, Saavedra burst in with the chiefs of the troops loyal to Liniers: Arribeños, Húsares, Patriotas de la Unión, together with the Tercios of Montañeses and Andaluces. They expressed their total support for the viceroy and forced him to tear up his resignation. Then, they ordered the rebels to withdraw. A brief charge by Martín Rodríguez's Húsares and the appearance of the Patriotas de la Unión's cannons in the square were enough to end the mutiny.

This uprising showed the future leaders of the First Junta (Saavedra and Moreno) on opposing sides: even then, they did not agree politically, and surely there was mutual antipathy. In addition, there were two Spanish "Tercios" that supported the viceroy: the Andaluces and the Montañeses; since many of their members were Creoles, sons of Spaniards. Another surprise was that the "Patriotas de la Unión," a corps created and supported by the Cabildo, confronted its own parent institution.

Grateful, Liniers acknowledged that "the energy and patriotism of the aforementioned Corps and Chiefs got me out of this conflict with the greatest determination". Saavedra said: "thus ended that memorable day... because, in fact, on it the arms of the sons of Buenos Aires brought down the pride and ambitious aims of the Spaniards and gained superiority over them."

Immediately afterwards, the rebellious "Tercios" were dissolved: Vizcaínos, Gallegos, and Catalans, and the Andaluces and Montañeses were spared. The former had their flags taken away, which were deposited in the Fort, and were forbidden to wear uniforms. The leaders of the plot were exiled, clearing the way of potential opponents to the mostly Creole forces.

The situation became more complicated with the arrival of Cisneros, replacing Liniers. Upon his arrival, the troops did not acclaim him, and he was received reluctantly. The new viceroy pardoned those responsible for January 1, and symbolically returned their flags to the officers of the dissolved Tercios; but without reconstituting them; leaving them as a "reserve," in case of need, as: "Batallones del Comercio." For economic reasons, he eliminated several smaller units. He reduced the Patricios battalions to 2 (from 3). He put only active officers on the payroll and eliminated 2 squadrons of the Húsares. 

Finally, "to avoid the rivalries that names usually introduce," he removed the names that the Infantry units had until then, and began to number them as simple "battalions." Thus: 1 and 2 correplied to the two remaining Patricios battalions; 3 to the Arribeños; 4 to the Montañeses, 5 to the Andaluces, 6 to the reserve of the Urban Commerce Corps, 7 to the Granaderos de Fernando VII, and 8 to Pardos y Morenos. This is how the last viceroy of the Río de la Plata gave the Patricios the number they still bear today, as Infantry Regiment No. 1. However, everyone continued to call the units by their traditional names, ignoring the viceroy's numbering.

These reforms ultimately earned the army's antipathy, which, having been "pampered" under Liniers's administration, now suffered "adjustment" at the hands of Cisneros, who also came to take away the names with which they had proudly expelled the English invader, and to vindicate the dissolved Spanish "Tercios." For this reason, the army, resentful toward the viceroy, decisively supported the actions of May 1810.

The First Junta, learning from its predecessors, gave great importance and impetus to the Army. On May 27, Juan Beruti recounts, "All the Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry troops formed a square in the plaza; the Junta came out, the President addressed them, and they swore obedience; then there was a volley of artillery and musket fire, with which the event concluded." 

Two days later (the 29th), and at the request of the Secretary of War and Government, Mariano Moreno, the Junta issued a proclamation (considered the formal birth of the Argentine Army); by which it recognized the troops' role during the events of May 25 and ordered several measures to increase "the military strength of these Provinces." 

It elevated all Infantry Battalions to Regiments (the opposite of what Cisneros had done), with 1,116 troops each. It ordered the reinstatement of those who had been discharged, "who were not currently practicing any mechanical trade or public service," and decreed a draft of "all vagrants and unemployed men," between 18 and 40 years old. The military member Miguel de Azcuénaga was in charge of the "Royal Armory," which provided rifles to each corps, according to the number of soldiers. Residents were required to deposit their weapons at Azcuénaga's house. Finally, it ordered that ALL enlisted soldiers be paid a salary. 

The Revolution knew that it was just beginning a difficult road toward Independence... That it would require much sacrifice, struggle, hardship, and blood... For this reason, it prepared itself, led by an army that had defeated the English and had contributed decisively to ending the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.