The market is changing the Argentina that bureaucrats wanted to preserve

The market is changing the Argentina that bureaucrats wanted to preserve
The market is changing the Argentina that bureaucrats wanted to preserve

Oil and trade openness show an economy capable of discovering opportunities that no official could anticipate

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A significant part of our history, Argentine economic policy acted as if it knew in advance what the country should produce. There were industries to protect, sectors considered strategic, activities that deserved subsidies, and markets that had to remain closed to maintain a certain productive structure. Behind that logic was a huge presumption: that a government official could know today which companies, products, and sectors would be most valuable tomorrow.

Oil has just provided a good reason to distrust that claim. Between January and September of this year, crude oil became Argentina's main export product, with sales of USD 7.753 billion, surpassing soybean meal, which reached USD 6.971 billion. In just five years, the exported value of oil multiplied by 6.5, driven by the growth of Vaca Muerta, new investments, and an expansion of production that is changing the structure of Argentine foreign trade.

The news can be superficially read as a change in positions in a ranking. It would be to miss the most interesting part. Argentina did not decide through a five-year plan that oil should dethrone soy. Nor was it necessary for someone to imagine from a ministerial desk what the main export product would be in 2026. Capital, knowledge, technology, and entrepreneurs found an economic opportunity that previously did not have that dimension and began to develop it.

That is precisely what happens in an economy when it can discover.

The productive advantages of a country are not set in stone. They change with technology, prices, infrastructure, consumer preferences, and the entrepreneurial capacity to find new uses for resources that have always been there. Vaca Muerta existed long before it became one of the engines of Argentine exports. What was lacking was not the resource beneath the ground, but the economic, technological, and investment conditions necessary to transform it into wealth.

That is why it would be absurd to interpret the rise of oil as a defeat for agriculture. There is no economic reason to choose between soy and energy, between mining and software, or between industry and services. That need to select “the sector that must win” belongs precisely to the mentality that assumes development needs a director from above. A freer economy allows for something much more powerful: that different entrepreneurs risk their own capital trying to discover what they can produce better and what consumers are willing to buy.

The debate on trade openness enters exactly at that point. Milei proposed to Endeavor entrepreneurs that he intends to raise the openness coefficient of the Argentine economy from around 30% to 90%, arguing that expanding the size of the market allows for the exploitation of increasing returns and accelerates growth. The discussion should not be reduced to how many imported products will enter. The fundamental question is whether Argentine companies will continue to organize around a protected internal market or if they will be able to think about their scale in terms of millions of consumers outside national borders.

Protectionism is often presented as a defense of national production, but it also has a less visible effect: it tries to preserve the existing economic structure. It protects those who already produce certain things in a certain way and reduces the pressure to discover other opportunities. The cost is not only that some consumers pay more. It is also the companies that never come into existence, the investments that are not made, and the external markets that no one attempts to conquer because all business logic ends up oriented inward.

Openness introduces a different discipline. Those who produce must compete for the voluntary decision of the consumer, whether Argentine or foreign. That can be uncomfortable for those who were used to a captive market, but it also brutally expands the horizon for those who are capable of offering something that the world wants to buy. The Argentine market has a few million households; the international market multiplies that scale several times.

Naturally, opening an economy does not allow one to know in advance who will win. That uncertainty is not a defect of the system: it is exactly the reason why it is superior to trying to plan the outcome. No minister knows what the next Vaca Muerta will be, what technology will change an industry, or which Argentine company will find a market in ten years that does not even exist today. Entrepreneurs do not know for sure either. The difference is that they risk capital trying to discover it.

The oil that today surpasses soybean meal should then serve as a warning against the arrogance of wanting to freeze the economy in the photograph of the present. Years ago, protecting “what we have” may have seemed prudent. Meanwhile, beneath our feet, an activity capable of altering the country's export history was growing.

The Argentina that is coming will probably not resemble exactly the one we imagine today. And that is good news. The challenge is not for the State to guess what the next star sector will be. It is to build an economy sufficiently free for someone to discover it.