Christian Di Candia, former mayor of Montevideo and current deputy secretary of Housing, said it bluntly in an interview with La Diaria: “The way to lower rent and the way to lower prices in the market is for the State to build housing for rent and offer it at lower prices.”
There it is, condensed in one sentence, the complete catechism of Uruguayan interventionism. There is no diagnosis of why prices are high. There is no mention of the tangled web of regulations, taxes, endless permits, rigid labor costs, or the destruction of private incentives. Just the same old recipe: more State, more public construction, and political prices. The rest of the market, according to this magical logic, “aligns” by contagion. As if prices were a number that can be decreed and not the result of millions of individual decisions.
Ludwig von Mises explained it with a clarity that still unsettles those who live off intervention. In his critique of the “middle path,” he demonstrated that isolated interventions do not stop. When the government sets a price below the market price—or when the State offers housing at subsidized prices—it creates relative scarcity. Demand skyrockets because the price no longer reflects the true scarcity of the good. Private supply retracts: who is going to invest capital, take risks, and maintain properties if the State competes with artificially low prices financed by taxes? Queues appear, informal rationing, deterioration of stock, and pressure for more controls. Each intervention creates the problem that justifies the next one. There is no stable “third way” between the market and socialism. Either prices are allowed to fulfill their signaling function—transmitting information about scarcity and preferences—or we move towards increasingly broad control.
Di Candia proposes exactly that: to turn the State into the great landlord at political prices. Where will the money come from to build and maintain these homes? From taxes. That is, from the destruction of private capital. Hans-Hermann Hoppe is even more direct and radical. The State does not produce wealth; it redistributes and consumes capital. “Public property” is not property in the strict economic sense: it lacks a residual owner who bears the losses. Without that owner, there is no rational calculation of costs or real incentives to maintain, improve, or allocate efficiently. What Hoppe calls institutionalized aggression against private property translates here into taxing those who build, maintain, and take risks to finance housing that the State itself manages with a permanent deficit, physical deterioration, and political clientelism.









