The disconnection between global markets and fuel prices under Orsi's government
The recent geopolitical stabilization in the Middle East, achieved through an agreement that reopened the Strait of Hormuz and reduced tensions over supply routes, triggered an immediate drop in the international price of crude oil. Both Brent and WTI fell nearly 5% in just a few days, reaching several-month lows.
One would expect this drop to quickly translate into relief for the energy costs of Uruguayans. However, under Yamandú Orsi's government, fuel prices at the pump have followed the opposite path. In June 2026, new increases were applied: Super gasoline rose by 6% to $93.36 per liter, and diesel increased by 7% to $61.76 per liter. These adjustments add to the series of previous increases and demonstrate that, even when oil prices fall globally, the Executive chooses to maintain or raise the pressure on local consumers.
This divergence is not a technical accident. It is the direct result of the control structure that Orsi's government maintains over hydrocarbons. The final price incorporates the international cost of crude oil, ANCAP's expenses, and, above all, a heavy burden of specific taxes that the State refuses to reduce. Through monthly decrees, the Executive Branch decides how much of the international variation is passed on to the public and how much is retained to feed the fiscal coffers. When oil prices rise, the mechanism transmits much of the blow. When they fall, as happened after the international agreement, the same system allows tax and state cost components to remain high or even increase if budgetary balance demands it.
This behavior is not exclusive to the current government. During Luis Lacalle Pou's administration, similar dynamics were observed: international drops in oil prices were rarely fully and quickly passed on to consumers, while increases were incorporated more swiftly. Orsi has not broken with that pattern; he has continued it and, at times, reinforced it.
Under Orsi's administration, this asymmetry has become systematic policy. Instead of taking advantage of the recent drop in crude oil to relieve households, the government preferred to consolidate increases that raise the costs of transportation, production, and daily consumption. Wage workers, small producers, and middle-income families pay the price: they see their real purchasing power diminish while the State extracts more resources to finance its spending. This type of adjustment acts as a regressive tax that punishes precisely those who depend on productive work and cannot pass on the higher costs.
The official argument that “there is no other choice” because “international reality demands it” is particularly weak when, in fact, the drop in oil prices has already materialized. What reality truly demands is a review of the government's priorities: either reduce public spending and alleviate the tax burden on fuels, or continue punishing the productive population to sustain the size of the State. Orsi has chosen the second option.
Prices are signals that coordinate economic activity. When the government persistently intervenes to distort them and retain part of the international drops, it generates unnecessary costs, reduces competitiveness, and erodes incentives for work and investment. The increases of June 2026, decided and applied despite the global easing context that was already emerging, confirm that under Orsi, energy policy does not seek to maximize the well-being of working Uruguayans, but rather to guarantee state revenues at their expense.
A different policy would require allowing reductions in international prices to reach the pump without excessive filters, accompanied by an effective reduction in specific taxes and stricter control of public spending. Only then could workers and families truly benefit from improvements occurring in global markets.
Meanwhile, Orsi's government continues to choose the path of fiscal extraction and administrative control, burdening the working people with the cost of decisions that prioritize budgetary balance over economic reality.
