The recent invasion of Ceuta exposed a vulnerability that Europe has been dragging for over two decades: weak external borders, insufficient expulsions, and dependence on third countries to contain illegal immigration.
The entry of around 72,000 people from Morocco, with about 100 dead and thousands still within the enclave, showed that the border of a European nation can collapse in hours.
The episode was not only humanitarian or police-related. Morocco controls one of the main land access keys to the European Union and can use migration cooperation as a tool for diplomatic pressure. Ceuta repeated, on a larger scale, the precedent of 2021, when more than 8,000 people crossed as relations between Rabat and Madrid deteriorated.
The central discussion is no longer about managing arrivals, but about determining whether Europe retains the capacity to decide who enters, who stays, and who must be expelled.
The demographic evolution, the electoral shift to the right in recent years, and the warning from Donald Trump demonstrate that mass immigration has become a problem of Western sovereignty.

Two decades of demographic transformation
Since the year 2000, the main countries of Western Europe have recorded a sustained increase in residents born abroad.
While Germany went from about 9 million in 2000 to 12 million in 2015 and 17.2 million in 2025, France advanced from approximately 6.3 million to 7.8 million and then to 9.6 million.
Spain showed the fastest change: from 1.7 million to nearly 5.9 million and 9.5 million. Meanwhile, Italy rose from around 2.1 million to 5.8 million and 6.9 million, and in the United Kingdom, the figure increased from 4.7 million in 2000 to about 8.5 million in 2015 and 13.1 million in 2024.
Furthermore, by 2025, the European Union had 64.7 million residents born abroad: 46.7 million had been born outside the bloc and 18 million in another member state, meaning that immigration is no longer a temporary flow and permanently alters the population composition.
The transformation also presents an interesting religious dimension, and it is estimated that the Muslim population in Europe will continue to increase significantly in the coming decades.

Muslims represented about 4.9% of the European population in 2016, compared to the current 8-10% and a projected 14% for 2050, considering that the demographic trend continues to be driven by migration, youth, and birth rates.
Also, in terms of fertility, the most marked differences are observed in France and Germany. In France, the fertility rate of Muslim women was around 2.9 children per woman between 2015 and 2020, compared to 1.8 among non-Muslims.
In Germany, the gap was similar: approximately 2.7 versus 1.5 in the same period. Additionally, there is a structural age difference: Muslim populations with a median age close to 30 years compared to over 43 in the general non-Muslim European population.
The European shift
In recent years, large sectors of the population perceived that traditional governments had lost border control and, with it, the ability to manage internal cohesion.
This change is not limited to an isolated political phenomenon, but reflects a growing social awareness that cultural integration is not always automatic or linear, and that there are deep tensions between different cultural models.










