The silent revolution that could retire the State

In his speech on Wednesday at the “Faro Foundation,” Javier Milei introduced one of the most disruptive ideas since he took office. He did not only talk about fiscal balance, inflation, or growth. He took a step further. Drawing on concepts developed by economist David Friedman, he proposed a much deeper transformation: replacing traditional state functions with market mechanisms based on insurance. This is not a technical detail. It is a paradigm shift that questions the very reason for the existence of a large part of the state machinery.

For decades, the Argentine debate has been trapped in a false dichotomy. The discussion seemed to boil down to how much the state should grow or shrink. The left defended expanding it without limits. More moderate sectors spoke of making it more efficient. Milei proposes something different: to ask whether many of those functions should exist in the hands of the state in the first place.

The difference is much deeper than it seems. Privatization means changing the administrator. The logic of insurance changes the entire system of incentives. Where bureaucracy reacts after damage has occurred, insurance has a direct economic interest in preventing that damage from happening. Those who insure a home invest in fire prevention. Those who insure a car promote responsible behaviors to reduce accidents. The incentive shifts from managing the problem to preventing it from arising.

This economic principle, barely mentioned in the presidential speech, could end up having revolutionary consequences. For generations, Argentines have been educated under the idea that every social need requires creating a public office, adding employees, approving new taxes, and expanding administrative structures. This logic has built an increasingly larger, more expensive state that, paradoxically, is less and less capable of fulfilling the functions it claimed to protect.

The tradition of the Austrian School has been pointing out this problem for decades. Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that without prices generated by voluntary exchanges, it is impossible to allocate resources efficiently. Jesús Huerta de Soto expanded on this reasoning, showing that all institutional coercion destroys the entrepreneurial capacity to discover better solutions. The result is not only a more costly state. It is a society that loses innovation because decisions cease to arise from millions of individuals and become concentrated in a bureaucracy incapable of processing all the dispersed information.

David Friedman takes this logic a step further. If private incentives work better to prevent risks than state administration, then many tasks traditionally monopolized by the state can be organized through voluntary contracts. Not because there is an abstract moral superiority of the market, but because economic incentives produce better results.

Here perhaps lies the most uncomfortable aspect for Argentine progressivism. For years, it built its power by promising state protection against any uncertainty. Every problem found the same answer: more regulation, more public agencies, more spending, and more taxes. However, experience shows that this path has generated exactly the opposite of what it promised: more poverty, more insecurity, more bureaucracy, and less capacity to resolve conflicts.

The proposal that Milei put on the table completely inverts that logic. Instead of a state that monopolizes protection, a society emerges where incentives reward prevention, efficiency, and individual responsibility. The citizen ceases to be a passive beneficiary of public policies and becomes an actor who makes decisions and assumes the consequences of their choices.

That is why this discussion transcends the economic context. It is not just about lowering taxes or reducing ministries. It is about replacing a model based on the concentration of power with another where voluntary cooperation and incentives coordinate solutions that no state office can plan from above.

Perhaps that is why the idea went almost unnoticed amid the daily political noise. However, deep transformations often begin exactly this way. They first appear as an intellectual hypothesis. Then they become the subject of debate. Finally, they end up modifying institutions that for decades seemed untouchable.

If fiscal balance was Milei's first great battle, the insurance revolution could become the next chapter of a much more ambitious transformation: to demonstrate that freedom not only produces more wealth. It can also offer better answers where the state has built a monopoly of failures for decades.